INTRODUCTION
A fascinating issue in applied ethics but one that has received little systematic attention is the issue of when it is permissible to appropriate the products of evil actions.
1 Should medical researchers, for example, be permitted to cite medical data obtained from the grossly unethical experiments conducted by the Nazis on Jewish prisoners during World War II? Should doctors be permitted to use fetal remains from elective abortions for research and transplantation purposes? Should we use products that have been manufactured in sweatshops? Should we use products that have been developed through research that was inhumane to animals? Even the issue of using embryonic stem cells can be cast as an appropriation of evil problem. Such problems are common in the moral life and cut across many areas of applied ethics, but they are not easy to sort out. And though much has been written on these issues individually, very little has been written on the general class of such problems.
Typically, the use to which we wish to put the putatively tainted object is a benevolent or at least morally neutral one, and this can make it difficult to see why appropriating the tainted object would be wrong. Most would find nothing wrong with the general act or act-type of using a dead person's tissue for transplant purposes, nor would they find it problematic to cite someone else's data in their research. So, if it is wrong to use a product of evil, it will have to be for another reason than that the act is inherently wrong, one that has something to do with the product's connection or association with evil. In this paper, I will examine this category of moral problems. I will first offer a more detailed characterization of the category of appropriation problems. Next, I will consider four rationales that have been advanced to oppose the use of various products of evil: the complicity rationale, the contamination rationale, the seepage and self-deception rationale and the encouragement of evil rationale. The first two are more past-looking rationales. That is, they maintain that the wrong of using a tainted product lies in the user's coming into contact or sharing in the original evil that gave rise to the product. The complicity rationale asserts that using a product of evil is wrong because the user becomes an accomplice, after the fact, to the original evil. The contamination rationale maintains that use of such products is wrong because the object is contaminated by its association with evil and thus the user herself becomes contaminated as well. I will argue that neither of these rationales is plausible because 1) it is difficult to make sense of the alleged connection to the past evil that each alleges and 2) because both are overbroad and lead to the condemnation of too many things. The seepage and self-deception rationale asserts that use of a product of evil is wrong if it leads to corruption seeping into the character of the appropriator. I will argue that, while corruption of character is a legitimate moral concern, it is not the most significant harm that can occur in appropriation cases and that the rationale is thus flawed for its excessive emphasis on that harm. The last rationale, that of encouragement of evil, is more plausible in that it doesn't allege that using products of evil is wrong because of the products' connection to past evils, rather it maintains that certain products of evil should not be appropriated if doing so will lead others to commit evil in the future. This rationale allows for case-by-case assessment of whether using a product of evil will lead to more evil in the future and thus, unlike the first two, does not suffer from the difficulty of condemning too many things. Further, the encouragement rationale is concerned more with harms that appropriators of evil may bring to others rather than themselves, and thus it does not suffer from the misplaced emphasis of the seepage and self-deception rationale.
Throughout the paper, I will make extensive use of examples of the problem taken from biomedical ethics, particularly the well-known issues involving Nazi data and fetal tissue research. Not only are these outstanding instances of appropriation problems, they also have the bonus of having had much written about them, and because of that they offer a great deal of insight into the rationales people offer in appropriation cases.
VARIETIES OF APPROPRIATION PROBLEMS
The class of appropriation problems is quite diverse. In this section, I will attempt to characterize the class more thoroughly and to isolate the factors that I believe are common to all instances of the problem. First, to point out the obvious, there must have been an evil action that gave rise to the object whose use we are contemplating. We cannot struggle over whether we should appropriate a product of evil if the object is not a product of evil, but resulted instead from some good or morally neutral action. I exercise my powers of stating the obvious here only because some of the examples I will draw upon involve using products of actions that are only very controversially regarded as evil. Some might assert, for example, that we needn't worry about appropriating tissue from aborted fetuses for research and transplantation purposes because abortion is not evil and thus using the tissue is, a fortiori, not an instance of appropriating evil. To be sure, there is no faster way to make an appropriation of evil problem disappear than to show that the originating act is not evil. For purposes of analyzing appropriation problems in general, however, it will be useful simply to assume the evil of actions like abortion. Much has been written on the fetal tissue issue and one can learn much about appropriation problems in general by examining this literature, regardless of one's views on the permissibility of abortion.
Secondly, all appropriation of evil problems involve using either 1) a product of a past evil action or 2) at least an object that, though strictly speaking is not a product of an evil action, is closely associated with evil or an evildoer in some way. The relevant class of products of evil certainly includes those objects that are intended to result from evil actions. When Nazi doctors performed their horrendous experiments on Jewish prisoners at the Dachau camp and other places, their intention (or at least one of their intentions) was to produce useful medical data. The data they produced is an intended product of their evil experiments, and the question of whether researchers of today should use that data is a paradigm example of an appropriation of evil problem. 2 However, appropriation of evil problems can also arise in connection with the use of unintended products of evil acts, such as would be the case if doctors and medical researchers were to use the tissue of an aborted fetus to transplant into a person suffering from Parkinson's disease or were to use the tissue for research on developing treatments for Parkinson's disease. The woman who had the abortion typically would not have intended to produce tissue for research or transplant purposes; her intent would simply have been to abort her fetus. The potentially useful fetal tissue that resulted is a mere by-product of her presumably evil act. 3 It also seems that appropriation problems can arise in connection with things that do not result from specific evil acts but are only symbolically associated with evil acts. A matter of perennial contention in the southern U.S. has been whether Confederate flags should be displayed on public buildings. 4 The Confederate flag is not, strictly speaking, a product of the evil of slavery based upon race; rather it is a symbol of a Southern culture and, perhaps, political ideology that included, along with many other practices both good and bad, the evil of slavery. The Confederate flags that would be flown today, according to most who wish to fly them, are not meant to condone that evil (though some perhaps mean this) but only to be expressions of regional pride. Yet many find the flag's association with evil strong enough to raise a clear instance of an appropriation of evil problem. Though the flag is not a product, strictly speaking, of slavery, intuitively the case seems recognizable as an appropriation of evil problem. Or, to take another example, suppose a strangler always employed a specific brand and style of scarf to kill his victims and, as his trademark, always left the scarf to be discovered at the scene of the crime. Many people might now find the wearing of that particular style and brand of scarf highly inappropriate. Though none of the scarves now being worn was actually used to kill anyone, it still, in light of the scarves' perceived association with evil, seems quite possible to regard the question of whether one should wear them as an appropriation of evil problem. Lastly, one might recoil from making use of an object that has no real connection to any evil action per se but is strongly associated with an evildoer. One, for example, may experience moral discomfort over using golf clubs that belonged to O.J. Simpson if one were convinced of his guilt in the slaying of his wife and her friend. This case is slightly different than the Confederate flag case, in that in the flag case the flag was the basic symbol of a regime that advocated slavery based upon race -it stood for the Confederacy; whereas O.J. Simpson's golf clubs have no such connection to him or the evil of the murders. They are simply things that belonged to someone who presumably committed a terribly immoral act. We might feel the same way about a pair of his cufflinks, one of his football jerseys or virtually any other of his personal effects. To sum up, then, in appropriation problems the relation of the putatively tainted object to its originating evil can vary greatly. Both the intended and unintended products of evil can raise appropriation worries. Yet objects that are not really products of an evil act at all but are only symbolically associated with such acts or with the person who commits such acts can raise appropriation concerns as well.
As for the present kinds of uses to which products of evil are put, I will limit my consideration to those which are non-evil. That is, I will only concern myself with cases in which the putatively tainted thing will be employed for morally good or at least morally neutral purposes (e.g., using fetal tissue to help a Parkinson's sufferer), and I will ignore entirely cases in which the tainted thing is to be used for an evil purpose. It is not that it is incoherent to think of cases where the tainted thing is to be used for immoral purposes as appropriation of evil instances. After all, we might say that someone who used a certain tainted scarf to strangle someone (a scarf which had been previously employed by another person to strangle someone else) had actually done two things wrong: strangled someone and appropriated an object associated with evil. But would we really care that the scarf was associated with evil? Would we not rather focus on the evil of the strangling? Appropriation of evil questions are most interesting and most pressing when the evil object is used to perform a type of action that is morally good or neutral, when the appropriation itself is the only evil alleged in the situation, and thus I will restrict my attention to these kinds of cases.
Despite the many variations in the problem, we can say that the problem always involves a past evil act (or acts) and a present use of a product (or other closely associated residue) 5 of that act. And (in light of the practical reason explained above) the present use of the product or the present association with the person will be a type of act which is good or at least morally neutral. Now, a moment's reflection will reveal that we encounter things that bear this sort of relation to past evils all the time. There are many things that bear a relation to an evil act very much like Nazi data or tissue from an aborted fetus but whose use strikes most people as unproblematic. Most people, including some who would oppose the use of fetal tissue, would find nothing troubling in the idea of using the organs from a murder victim for transplant purposes. The case of using organs from a murder victim appears to fit the mold of an appropriation problem just as well as the fetal tissue case, and it is undoubtedly proper to regard it as an instance of the problem. The challenge for any rationale that is offered for opposing the use of some tainted products will thus be to explain in a deep and principled way why it is not also wrong to appropriate other tainted products. In the next section, I will consider how well various proposed rationales for opposing the use of evil products have fared on this (and other) scores. This rationale essentially asserts that appropriating an evil object would be wrong because such actions make one an accomplice after the fact to the past evil act. The claim is that when one, for instance, appropriates the tissue of an aborted fetus one actually becomes a participant or sharer in the original evil of the abortion. How can this be? The transaction which comprised the past abortion has seemingly been completed, and let us assume that the woman would have had the abortion regardless of whether the tissue of her fetus would be used for research or transplant purposes. So how can someone who now uses the fetus' tissue become complicitous in the original evil of the completed abortion? This is clearly not the way we typically understand what it means to be an accomplice to an evil act. According to James Burtchaell, who has staunchly advocated this rationale as a ground for opposing the use of fetal tissue, the kind of complicity involved in the use of fetal tissue and other appropriation cases is that of giving approval, implicitly or explicitly to a past evil act: "It is the sort of association which implies and engenders approbation that creates moral complicity. This situation is detectable when the associate's ability to condemn the activity atrophies." 6 This form of complicity should be distinguished from other more well-known forms of complicity. Most involve a person's making a causal contribution to the commission of some evil act. Such acts as driving a getaway car or serving as a lookout for bank robbers causally contribute to the carrying out of the bank robbery, and they certainly render one an accomplice to the robbery. However, as Burtchaell explains, there is a second basic type of complicity. This second form is present when my association with the evil causes me to become corrupted alongside the principal agent. Actually the chief effect of evil behavior is not the harm it inflicts on another but the moral disintegration and compromise it incurs in myself. This latter, more intrinsic element of complicity is present even when actual causative harm is not. 7 He then goes on to assert that use of tissue from electively aborted fetuses makes one complicitous in abortion in just this way. The scientist who employs the tissue for research is engaging in conduct that will contribute to her "moral disintegration and compromise," even if it does not causally contribute to the act of abortion that produced the tissue. She is, therefore, an accomplice after the fact to the abortion. 8 It is also important to recognize that under Burtchaell's form of complicity it does not matter what one's attitude is toward the past evil. One need not actually approve of the evil of the past abortion to become this type of accomplice to it. If one merely uses the tissue of the aborted fetus, one is an accomplice to the abortion that produced it, even if one disapproves of abortion, for one's ability to condemn the abortion has atrophied. 9 It seems we might well object to the complicity rationale on the grounds that it strains the notion of complicity beyond recognition to say people who make use of products of evil are accomplices to the evils that created those products. Such people may be guilty of something, but it is difficult to see how they are guilty of being accomplices to the original evil. It only confuses the situation to label such a person an accomplice to the act. Now, perhaps Burtchaell and others who deploy this rationale are only using "accomplice" in a symbolic way. Perhaps the wrong of using these products of evil lies primarily in the way that such use displays a certain callousness or moral desensitization towards the originating evil on the part of the user, or that the use will, in time, lead to such desensitization of the user. And if one did become desensitized to the originating evil in that way, then, though one did not actually aid in the commission of the original evil, one would be a symbolic accomplice to that evil, since one would not be capable of registering the appropriate disapproval to the evil any longer. But if this is what's wrong with using the tainted products of evil, then why bother with the complicity talk at all? Why not just say that using products of evil can harden one morally and that's why it is wrong to use them? Labeling such behavior complicity, as Burtchaell does, and leaving us to try to make sense of how one can be an accomplice after the fact to the original evil simply creates needless confusion. Indeed, ethicist M. Cathleen Kaveny, who coined the name "appropriation of evil" for the type of problems under consideration in this paper, has gone to great lengths to distinguish moral complicity or cooperation problems from appropriation of evil problems. Essentially for Kaveny, the former involve situations where one actually "facilitates someone else's morally objectionable activity," while the latter involve "taking advantage of the fruits or by-products of someone else's wrongful acts in order to facilitate their own morally worthwhile activity." 10 By contrast, Burtchaell counterintuitively expands the category of complicity to include the latter. Yet, like Burtchaell, Kaveny believes that what makes it wrong to appropriate evil products (in cases where it is wrong to appropriate them) is that such appropriation can result in the same desensitization of moral character just spoken of. 11 Kaveny's approach of not bringing these types of cases under the complicity label is surely preferable.
Be this as it may, a more telling criticism of the complicity rationale, I believe, is that it simply leads to the condemnation of too many things. Many acts which seem quite unobjectionable morally would be viewed as evil under the rationale. The following example from John Robertson illustrates this rather well:
A useful analogy here is donation of organs and cadavers from homicide victims. Families of murder victims (or coroners if no family is known) are often asked to donate organs and bodies for research and education. If they consent, organ procurement agencies will coordinate the retrieval and distribution of organs from them for transplant. No one would seriously argue that the surgeon who transplants the victim's kidneys, heart, liver, skin, or corneas into a needy recipient becomes an accomplice in the homicide that made the organs available for transplant if he knows their source. Nor is the recipient of the transplanted organs or the medical student who uses the cadaver of a murder victim in anatomy class. 12 If supporters of the complicity rationale seriously wish to maintain that one can become a blameworthy accomplice to the evil of abortion after the fact by using the tissue of an aborted fetus for benevolent medical purposes, even if one disapproves of abortion, it is difficult to see how their rationale would not also condemn the use of organs from murder victims and other products of evil. The challenge for supporters of the rationale is thus to provide a plausible way of distinguishing intuitively permissible uses of evil products like that of organ donation from murder victims from cases of impermissible uses of evil products. Burtchaell appears to be aware of the need to make such distinctions, but he does not seem to have a principled basis for drawing them. Rather he sets forth only common sense as a guide:
There is no measurable way to determine such complicity. One must use sense and judgment, and one's assessments will be arguable. But they will be real. Imagine a pharmaceutical experiment carried out on an unsuspecting group of women in a Third-World country: an experiment which leads to the death of several dozen subjects. If tissue from their cadavers were available from the experimenters for further research, it would seem that those who used the specimens could not avoid being complicit, albeit after the fact, with those who had destroyed those women. If the primary research, however, had led to the production of a new and powerfully therapeutic medication, a physician who prescribed that drug, even though sadly aware of its malicious origins, could reasonably be considered not to have entered into confederacy with the offense. This is a distinction arrived at by analogy, not by measurement. 13 The new therapeutic drug is arguably just as much a product of the immoral experiment as is the tissue from the women's cadavers, and if using the product of evil makes one an accomplice regardless of one's attitude towards the originating evil, then what is it that distinguishes the former use from the latter morally? Burtchaell's remarks in the above quote lead one to think that under his view there is no moral distinction between the two cases other than that the two cases strike his moral judgment or his moral intuitions differently. From the standpoint of Burtchaell's description of moral complicity, however, the cases seem indistinguishable. Perhaps more resources for distinction could be found from within the complicity rationale but I am unaware of any others at the moment, and no one else has attempted to offer any. Thus, I believe the complicity rationale is deeply flawed by its overbreadth.
The Contamination Rationale
What I am calling the contamination rationale says that things that result from evil are contaminated or tainted and simply should not be touched, for those who touch such things become contaminated themselves. The proper attitude towards such things is abhorrence and disgust, and we should stay away from them. There is a sense, albeit metaphoric for most people, that evil is like a contagious disease and by handling the products of evil, since such things carry the disease, we will become contaminated or infected ourselves. Under this rationale, the primary concern is not necessarily that after we have become infected we will go out and commit evil, either of the type that created the product or some other. The concern seems to be rather that we become dirtied, stained, sullied simply by contact with products of evil, and, of course, the implication is that there is something inherently wrong with being in this state.
14 Ethicist Stephen Post appears to invoke this rationale to oppose the use of the data collected by the Nazis:
To articulate why use of tainted data is morally revolting, I will employ here the term 'abomination', used among cultural anthropologists to designate how all societies set boundaries to avoid contact with what is extremely and totally horrid. Abomination as a cultural concept has to do with establishing the line between civilization and the moral abyss (the summum malum) around which ethics builds fences . . . . It is a moral intuition that such tainted goods, even if useful, are steeped in such a degree of moral failure that their use is a grave profanity under all circumstances. Our common moral response is to look aghast at those who would benefit from atrocity. The practice of salvaging good from such evil, it might be said, brings medicine into touch with the untouchable. 15 It is not always easy to ascertain what proponents of this rationale are saying. 16 People who invoke this rationale may not actually think that a person who uses a product of evil is literally unclean or contaminated by anything in a physical sense. But, then, what do they think is wrong with someone who touches the contaminated? As Paul Ricoeur points out in his book, The Symbolism of Evil:
In truth, defilement was never literally a stain; impurity was never literally filthiness, dirtiness. It is also true that impurity never attains the abstract level of unworthiness; otherwise the magic of contact and contagion would have disappeared. The representation of defilement dwells in the half-light of a quasiphysical infection that points toward a quasi-moral unworthiness. This ambiguity is not expressed conceptually but is experienced intentionally in the very quality of the half-physical, half-ethical fear that clings to the representation of the impure. 17 Ricoeur affirms that moral uncleanness is not literal uncleanness or dirtiness. Contact with things associated with evil only results in a "quasiphysical infection" which places one in a state of "quasi-moral unworthiness." Quasi-moral unworthiness is not real moral unworthiness, so what is wrong, after all, with someone who finds herself in this state? Perhaps the answer lies in the "half-physical, half-ethical fear" of the unclean or "dread of the impure" of which Ricoeur speaks. Many people are quite honestly fearful of, or disgusted by, things that are associated with evil (especially when the evils are horrendous), so fearful that they would not want to have anything to do with such things. Perhaps those who feel this way wonder about the character of other people who seem able to touch such things. Why aren't they fearful and disgusted as well? This suspicion of character is certainly suggested in the above quote from Post concerning those who would use the Nazi data. Those who are willing to appropriate the products of evil fail to display the appropriate amount of moral horror towards the past evils; they have become desensitized morally and perhaps that is the sense in which they are contaminated by their contact with the products of evil. At least this is what is suggested by the statements of Post and others.
We should take note of one qualification of the contamination rationale. For advocates of this rationale, affixing the label "contaminated" to an object may not always mean that the object cannot be appropriated for good. Sometimes with contamination comes the possibility of cleansing. That is, though one may become contaminated by handling a product of evil, one can perhaps wash one's hands of whatever moral guilt is involved in using the product. This, I believe, is a way of interpreting some who, though they view such things as Nazi data as tainted by evil, say that we may use the data so long as when we do we issue a strong formal denunciation of the evil that produced the data. 18 This denunciation can be viewed as a kind of rite of purification by which those who employ the tainted product cleanse themselves from contact with the product, but which still allows them to reap whatever benefit that can be gained from the product. Those who advocate the contamination rationale may not be willing to prescribe such a purification ritual in all such cases or in any cases. Nevertheless, such rituals could conceivably be part of a morality that treats this kind of contamination as a morally significant notion.
Still, there is a serious difficulty facing the contamination rationale. Like the complicity rationale, it seems to condemn too many things. Why would it not be just as wrong to use the organs of a murder victim for transplant purposes as any other product of evil? Shouldn't we view the organs as defiled themselves and anyone who appropriates them for another purpose as consequently defiled as well? If not, then how shall we distinguish the organ donation case from the Nazi data or fetal tissue cases? Is it only the products of particularly abominable evils that are contaminated? This last question seems rather pertinent, for it seems that generally the contamination rationale is most often put forward when the past evil is especially disgusting or abhorrent. It is seldom heard from otherwise. I am not saying that one could not construct a coherent theory for when to call something contaminated and when not to, but the onus to do so is surely upon those who would actually employ the contamination rationale to condemn a beneficial use of a product of evil, and, as far as I am aware, this onus has yet to be met. Now, the contamination rationale may seem to possess resources to deal with this overbreadth allegation. The rituals of purification spoken of earlier may provide a way of limiting the number of tainted products that are forbidden. All objects that bear the requisite connection to past evil will still be contaminated, but if they are cleansed in the appropriate way, they can still be used. Such a purification ritual could be employed, for example, in the case of a murder victim's organs in order to allow their use. The problem with this response, though, is that there appears to be no principled way to determine when the cleansing ritual should be applied and when it shouldn't. It could conceivably be applied to any evil product, making any product permissible to use. But those who apply the contamination rationale as grounds for not appropriating certain evils would presumably not find this result acceptable. They would want to say that use of some tainted objects should not be allowed, but they would, I believe, be hard pressed to explain, again in a principled way, why the cleansing can only be applied to some contaminated objects but not others. Thus I do not believe the purification ritual response will be of much help to the proponent of the contamination rationale.
The Seepage and Self-Deception Rationale
This rationale has been advanced by Cathleen Kaveny. The rationale draws upon the idea, central to Catholic moral theology generally, that, "an evil act does its greatest damage to the one who performs it." 19 In particular, it is the character of the evil actor that is warped by an evil act and such damage is often worse than the damage done to the victim of the evil act. This character damage, in Kaveny's parlance, can take the form of either seepage or self-deception. For purposes of appropriation problems, seepage occurs when an appropriator, because she is gaining benefits from using a product of evil, begins to view the originating evil in a more positive way. Consider a medical researcher who is opposed to or at least ambivalent towards abortion. Suppose further that the researcher is now engaged in fetal tissue research and believes that the research holds great promise for many very sick people. If, as a result of this belief in the promise of fetal tissue use, the researcher eventually comes to view abortion more favorably, then the character damage Kaveny refers to as seepage has occurred. Self-deception in appropriation cases occurs when one deludes oneself about one's motives for using the product of evil. If the researcher just mentioned, instead of acknowledging the shift in her views on abortion, told herself that she still opposed abortion as much as ever (even though her opposition to abortion had in fact eroded) and that all she was doing was trying to help people or salvage some good from the evil, she would be self-deceived. Such seepage and self-deception, for Kaveny, are the principal harms that can arise when one appropriates evil. Now, Kaveny does not believe that seepage and self-deception occur every time one uses a product of evil. There can be cases where one appropriates an evil product and yet still remains as opposed as ever to the original evil and is not self-deceived about this opposition. Thus, Kaveny stresses the need to examine each case carefully to see whether seepage or self-deception is present, and if neither is present, then it may be permissible to use the evil product. This case-sensitive feature of her view affords her at least the possibility of avoiding the problem of condemning too many things which beset both the complicity and contamination rationales.
I certainly agree with Kaveny that seepage and self-deception are morally significant harms that can occur in one who appropriates a product of evil. I find her claim that these are the primary harms to be less convincing, however. I find the prospect of someone other than the appropriator being harmed as a result of the appropriator's act more troubling than the prospect of character damage to the appropriator, though character damage to the appropriator is indeed a harm and should be regarded as having moral significance. If the practice of citing Nazi data would embolden a present-day researcher to treat a research subject in an unethical manner (because the present-day researcher would feel that his unethical research, like that of the Nazis, would still be cited), then that is a more worrisome harm than any seepage or self-deception that might have occurred in those who cite the Nazi data or, for that matter, in the present-day researcher. Kaveny may well be able to acknowledge such harms to others as morally significant on her view, but there can be no doubt that, for her, the primary feature of appropriating an evil that would make it wrong is its tendency to corrupt the character of the appropriator. Such emphasis upon the appropriator strikes me as plainly misplaced. 20 
The Encouragement of Evil Rationale
This rationale asserts that if appropriating an evil product will encourage the commission of evil in the future, then the appropriation is, prima facie at least, wrong. For example, it has been argued by various people that employing tissue from aborted fetuses for transplant or research purposes will encourage some women to get abortions who might not otherwise have done so. 21 Such women may feel that their abortion might help someone else if their fetus' tissue is used in this manner, and so they will have an added factor in their deliberations that speaks in favor of having the abortion. However, if we refuse to employ the tissue for research or transplantation, then this positive factor will be removed and perhaps some of these women will choose not to go through with the abortion after all. 22 Thus, under the encouragement rationale it is not that things associated with evil have any magical property that contaminates the user of them, or that by using such objects we somehow become accomplices after the fact to the original evil; it is rather that using such objects will be wrong if such use will lead to concrete instances of evil in the future. The encouragement rationale, unlike the complicity and contamination rationales, does not look back at the originating evil as the source of the evil of using products of evil. It looks in the opposite direction, to future evils, to find the basis for saying that use of a given product of evil is wrong. This provides the encouragement rationale with a decided advantage over the complicity and contamination rationales, for, as we have seen, it is difficult to make out just how an evil product contaminates its user or how a person using an evil product becomes a participant in the original evil that gave rise to the product. How is it that one can become an accomplice to an evil act that has seemingly been completed long ago? How is it that evils of the past contaminate an object associated with those evils so that those who handle the object become contaminated themselves? Further, if we adopt either of those two rationales, how will we avoid condemning the use of everything associated with past evils in the same way? Answers to these questions do not appear to be forthcoming. On the other hand, the encouragement rationale says that using an evil product will be wrong only when such use is likely to lead to evil in the future. It is not difficult to understand the idea that an action of today might result in evil in the future. It may be difficult to determine in certain cases whether evil really will be encouraged, but at least the very idea of an act's leading to other evil actions in the future does not leave one wondering what the nature of the evil might be. In addition, the encouragement rationale has the potential to avoid problems of overbreadth, because it will only oppose use of evil products when it looks as though such use will lead to more evil in the future, and that will not always be the case. Finally, the encouragement rationale does not display the misplaced emphasis on the character damage to the appropriator of the seepage and self-deception rationale, for it is primarily concerned not with the character harms that might accrue to the appropriator but with more instances of evil resulting, and character damage to the appropriator is but one such instance. For these reasons, I believe it is the most plausible of the four rationales. In what follows, I will try to spell out the encouragement rationale more fully and show its preferability to the others.
There is much that needs clarifying in the encouragement rationale. First, we must consider the sorts of evils whose encouragement we wish to avoid. More often than not, we will be concerned to avoid encouraging evils of the same type as the evil that gave rise to the product in question. As mentioned above, the principal concern of many who oppose the appropriation of fetal tissue from elective abortions is that the appropriation will lead to more abortions. Similarly, many who oppose the citation of Nazi research in contemporary medical science allege that if we allow citation of it, researchers of today will be encouraged to mistreat research subjects in their own research. Appropriation of evil products could conceivably encourage other types of evil than that of the originating evil, though. Someone might object to use of fetal tissue on the grounds that such use will encourage society to objectify women, in that if tissue from women's aborted fetuses could provide strong therapeutic benefits to people with serious diseases, women might come to be viewed as akin to medicine cabinets. Such harm, if it were encouraged by fetal tissue use, would be of a different type than the evil of abortion but would still be a relevant evil to consider for purposes of the encouragement rationale. We could also regard the seepage and self-deception harms emphasized by Kaveny as another evil that might be encouraged in certain appropriation cases.
Second, we must clarify what it means to encourage evil. I believe that use of a product of evil encourages a person to commit evil if and only if the following three conditions are met:
• Condition 1: the person commits an evil act.
• Condition 2: use of the evil product influenced the person to look more favorably on the commission of that act than she would have otherwise.
• Condition 3: without that favorable influence the person would not have committed the act.
We might feel that if use of a product merely led a person to look more favorably on an evil action than she would have otherwise, then evil has been encouraged, whether she commits the action or not. Condition 1, however, requires that the person actually commit an evil act. There may seem to be something wrong with merely causing people to look more favorably on an evil, even if they do not commit the evil. However, in light of the fact that, according to my set up of appropriation cases, use of the product will be for a morally good or at least neutral purpose, such inconsequential encouragement does not seem to be much of a basis for opposing the use of evil products. If fetal tissue, for instance, holds promise for remarkable therapeutic benefits, then the fact that some would merely look more favorably upon elective abortion (but will not actually get abortions that they would not otherwise have gotten) seems a fairly impotent reason for opposing the therapeutic use of fetal tissue. Condition 3 captures the intuitively plausible idea that there is no meaningful encouragement of an evil action if the agent would have committed the act anyway. We might be concerned about the wrong of making someone more disposed to commit an evil even if they would have done it anyway, but, again in light of the fact that there may be substantial benefits (or at least no harm) in using a product of evil, such inconsequential encouragement seems not to carry enough moral significance to warrant a ban on using the evil product. It would not be sufficient to say evil had been encouraged, though, if it was only that use of an evil product led a person to commit an evil he would not have committed otherwise. For example, while Jones, who is married and has always been faithful to his wife, is in the hospital to receive a fetal tissue transplant, he meets a doctor with whom he later has an affair. Should we say that since but for the use of fetal tissue this act would not have happened, then fetal tissue use has encouraged evil? Clearly not, and this is why Condition 2 is needed. That fetal tissue was being used would seemingly not have entered into Jones' deliberations over whether to have the affair. For use of a product of evil to encourage evil it seems that the use must positively influence the agent's deliberations about whether to commit evil.
We should also distinguish different ways that use of a product of evil can favorably affect an agent's deliberations. There can be what I will call direct favorable influence on the agent's deliberations. Direct favorable influence is at work when the fact that the product of his evil action can be used for good is a conscious positive factor in his deliberations about whether to commit the evil. Suppose a couple is having difficulty conceiving a child and that they are considering whether to employ in vitro fertilization to enhance their chances of conception. If they consciously consider the prospect that any unused embryos could be appro-priated for their stem cells and then used for medically beneficial therapies or research and if this factor, for them, speaks in favor of employing IVF to remedy their situation, then stem cell use is exerting direct favorable influence upon the couple. If we further suppose that they do elect to use IVF and without this conscious factor they would not have resorted to IVF, then stem cell use has encouraged evil (of course, as always, on the assumption that the hyper stimulation regime associated with IVF, along with its attendant embryo destruction, is evil). 23 Appropriation of a product of evil can also exert indirect positive influence on an agent's deliberations. This occurs when use of the product of evil promotes an environment or context in which the originating evil is regarded favorably. It is not that people who are encouraged in this way consciously contemplate that the product of evil will be used for good; it is rather that the benefits of using the evil product have led to a situation in which society views the original evil in a more positive light. If fetal tissue transplantation proved to have substantial therapeutic benefits, it may lead society overall to regard abortion in a more favorable light. This generally more positive attitude towards abortion could make it easier for some to opt for abortion than they could have without the more positive context brought forth by fetal tissue appropriation. I believe this type of situation should be recognized as encouragement of evil just like its more direct counterpart.
Though, as I have asserted, the encouragement rationale does not suffer from the rather serious problem of overbreadth that afflicts the complicity and contamination rationales, it does face two complications in its application to particular cases. The first complication is the practical difficulty of determining when use of an evil product will encourage evil and how much evil will be encouraged. The second complication involves the question of whether, even if evil is encouraged in a given case, there may still be considerations which allow us to justify our going ahead with using the evil product anyway. With respect to the first of these complications, we are confronted with no less a challenge than that of predicting the future. We are asked to gauge how use of a product of evil will affect the deliberations of people who are considering the commission of the evil that gives rise to that product, and this is certainly no easy task. Having acknowledged this challenge, however, I believe there are some considerations that can offer a modest amount of guidance in these situations. First, we should assess how significant the benefits of using the product will be. In general, it seems reasonable to think that the greater the benefit, the more likely it is that use of the product will encourage evil; while the less significant the benefit, the less likely it will be that use of the product will encourage others to commit evil. Of course, the greater the benefit of using the evil product, the stronger will be the inclination that we be permitted to use it as well. The competing pulls of appropriation problems are greatly in evidence in such a situation. Still, it seems right to say that greater benefits carry greater risks of encouragement. Second, we should attempt to determine the level of societal support towards the originating evil. While we ourselves may be convinced that the originating evil is evil, there may be a significant segment of society that does not think so. In general, the greater the level of societal support for the originating evil, the greater the chance of encouragement. If the vast majority of people in a society condemn the originating evil, people will be far less likely to be favorably influenced by use of the products of the evil. This, I believe, is one reason why appropriating organs from a murder victim carries little potential to encourage the evil of murder. Society's opposition to murder is so deeply entrenched that the possibility of the organs being used will not favorably influence someone to commit a murder he would not have committed otherwise (i.e., it will not directly influence someone to commit murder), nor is it likely to create an environment in which murder itself comes to be regarded more favorably than it would be otherwise (i.e., it will not indirectly influence people to commit murder). The situation might be very different, however, in the fetal tissue case, given our society's deep ambivalence regarding abortion. In such an ambivalent context, it would presumably be much easier to be favorably influenced towards abortion by the use of fetal tissue than it would be if abortion were more widely condemned. Lastly, it is important to consider whether the evil action is the only way that the evil product can be obtained or if there are other, nonevil ways of obtaining it. Encouragement risks will generally be stronger when the originating evil is the only way to obtain the beneficial object. With respect to this consideration, encouragement risks are again low in the case of appropriating organs from murder victims, for the vast majority of donor organs are obtained from non-murder victims. The association of donor organs with murder is therefore weak and so use of organs from murder victims is unlikely to influence people, directly or indirectly, to commit murder. When we consider the case of fetal tissue, though, things are again quite different. Since elective abortion is the only feasible way to obtain fetal tissue (tissue from spontaneous abortions is not usable because of frequent defects in spontaneously aborted fetuses), then if an industry or therapeutic practice developed around the use of the tissue, it would be very difficult to prevent encouragement of abortion from occurring, especially indirect encouragement. 24 It seems very likely that society would come to view abortion more favorably in such a setting, since it was providing such great therapeutic benefits. Moreover, it seems unlikely that society would have any motivation to implement steps to curtail abortion in such a setting, for then the tissue supply would simply dry up.
These, then, are some considerations that can be consulted as we assess encouragement risks. Each of the factors comes in degrees (as opposed to being 'all or nothing' factors), and, admittedly, it will be difficult to gauge precisely to what degree each factor is present. Nevertheless consideration of these factors in a given case can, I believe, provide some help in determining how likely use of a product of evil is to encourage evil in the future.
The second complication facing the encouragement rationale is that even if we can determine that evil will be encouraged, that, by itself, does not necessarily show that use of the product is wrong. Various potentially mitigating moral considerations could come into play even after we've determined that evil will be encouraged. First, of course, are the benefits that using the product will bring. These will naturally have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, but in many of the more prominent appropriation cases (e.g., fetal tissue and stem cell research), the benefits are potentially quite substantial. Now, consideration of this will not just be a simple matter of comparing the amount of benefit conferred by using the evil product with the amount of harm inflicted by the increase in the originating evil. Much will depend on what the nature of the originating evil is as well. We cannot take one person's life so that we can harvest her organs to save the lives of five others, even though the benefits of doing so would seem to outweigh the harms.
Other, more deontological, moral considerations need to be examined as well. Some might argue that if we do not intend more instances of the originating evil to occur but merely foresee that more instances will occur, then that could lessen blameworthiness or remove it altogether in these cases, especially when using the product leads to great benefits. In addition, some might argue that it typically will not be the appropriators of the evil products themselves that will commit the additional instances of the originating evil (e.g., fetal tissue researchers will not typically be the people who get abortions they would not have gotten otherwise). Another agent intervenes to commit the additional evil and that may lessen the responsibility of the appropriator enough so that the benefits of the appropriation override the wrong of the appropriation for which the appropriator is responsible. 25 Here again, though, the mere presence of such potentially mitigating considerations will not automatically justify appropriation of evil when encouragement of evil is likely to occur. If the originating evil is grave enough, then the worry that more instances of it will occur will probably not be sufficiently assuaged by pointing to philosophical niceties involving distinctions between intention and foresight, the agent's actions versus those of intervening agents, and so on. Nevertheless a careful moral evaluation of a situation in which evil will be encouraged due to the appropriation of products of that evil requires that we take such distinctions into account.
Yet even with the complications involved in determining when evil will be encouraged and of balancing the harm of that additional evil with the mitigating moral considerations just discussed, I still believe that the encouragement rationale fares far better than the complicity rationale, the contamination rationale, or the seepage and self-deception rationale. The complicity and contamination rationales suffer from fairly fatal overbreadth problems and there appear to be no principled ways to reign in their excessive breadth. The seepage and self-deception rationale, though it does not suffer from the problem of overbreadth, suffers from an overemphasis upon the harm to the character of the appropriator instead of on the harm to the victims of the appropriation. The encouragement rationale does not oppose all cases of appropriation, only those that will lead to an increase in evil. And while it can be a difficult matter to judge whether evil will increase and how much moral significance we should assign to the increase, this is more an indication that the rationale is attuned to the actual complexities of these cases rather than that it is fundamentally flawed like the other rationales. Appropriation of evil cases are morally complex and the encouragement rationale allows us to take official notice of the benefits and harms that make them so. Much of Kaveny's article focuses upon distinguishing the more familiar category of cooperation with evil from appropriation of evil. Articulating this distinction is important for Kaveny, as she is working within the Catholic moral tradition and coopera- 24 Under current federal law, fetal tissue research is eligible for federal funding. See 42 U.S.C. 289g. However, the law contains requirements designed to minimize risk of at least some direct encouragement of abortion. Among other things, the statute requires that women not be able to designate recipients for their tissue, that they not be told of any particular recipients and that the decision to abort is made before the physician broaches the prospect of tissue donation. See sections 289g-1(b) and 289g-2(a). These requirements do not seem able to prevent all direct encouragement, though. If a pregnant woman knew of fetal tissue research and transplantation and if the possibility of helping someone (not any particular person) spoke in favor of having an abortion for her, then she might still be encouraged to have the abortion by the practice of using fetal tissue (assuming the other conditions for encouragement had been met as well). How many women would be encouraged to have abortions they would not otherwise have had because of this is unclear, however. 25 The impact of these non-consequentialist mitigating moral considerations on the fetal tissue issue is discussed in Gillam, pp. 415-425.
